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Chapter 13
Social Structure of Accumulation Theory for the Arab World:
The Economies of Egypt, Jordan and Kuwait in the Regional System
Karen Pfeifer

Applying SSA Analysis to the Arab World
The theory of social structures of accumulation (SSA) was developed to explain long swings
of alternating expansion and stagnation in Western capitalist economies. The post-World War II
SSA led by the United States entailed the projection of U.S. military power overseas, the allocation
of U.S. foreign aid to allies and protégés, and the investment of U.S. surplus capital abroad. United
States hegemony provided assurance of energy and raw material supplies and new arenas for the
global spread of capitalist production, as well as the growth of markets for U.S. and, increasingly,
Western European and Japanese exports. Because many areas of the Arab region were rich in easily
extractable sources of energy and conveniently located near Europe, controlling the region became
an integral part of the United States’ economic and political strategy as it replaced shrinking British
and French imperial power.
The importance of SSA analysis is double-barreled for understanding economies of the
Arab World. First, the establishment and evolution of this "post-World War II SSA" led by the
United States, and its evolving contradictions, constituted the international context within which the
Arab territories attained political independence as new “nations” and undertook “modern” economic
development. Second, the SSA conceptual apparatus can be used to examine the economic
achievements and internal contradictions of the Arab countries and the institutions facilitating or
impeding accumulation in each period of their post-war history.
The cases of Egypt, Jordan, and Kuwait illustrate the spectrum of variation within the
regional SSA in both internal economic features and external relations.1 Egypt represents the
subgroup of more populated countries that have bigger agricultural sectors, a greater degree of
industrialization, larger domestic markets and more internal economic articulation than the other
groups. Jordan represents a second subgroup with smaller populations, small agricultural sectors,
small but significant industrialization, and greater dependence on the export of labor to generate
national income. Kuwait represents a third subgroup, “rentier” economies defined by the export of
oil and natural gas and very small agricultural and manufacturing sectors, which, with small
populations of citizens and relatively high per capita incomes, are dependent on the import of goods,
labor and other services to be economically viable.
While the SSA approach was developed with an economy like that of the United States in
mind, an industrialized capitalist country with a long history of internal articulation, a full analysis
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requires consideration of the United States' place in the international system. In parallel, both the
internal and the external aspects are also important for analysis of the Arab economies, but the
balance between the two is reversed. The Arab region has its own internal dynamics, but it does not
have a long history of capitalist development in which internal articulation could have occurred.
Furthermore, the region’s proximity to and continuous interaction with Europe, and the conflicted
place of the Arab countries in the U.S.-dominated international system, have pressed much more
urgently on their internal economic policy and institutional structure than vice versa (Lockman
2004: chap.4).
There is an overarching regional SSA for the Arab World, with local national variations
on its central institutions and with significant interaction among the countries that make up the
region. Arabic language and culture, including music, food, cinema and now media (e.g., Al Jazeera
television network), continue to provide a strong identity to the native Arabic speakers of the region.
They share a pervasive sense of common history, of a civilization without national borders until the
early twentieth century. “Arab nationalism” as an ideology of cultural and political unity arose in the
late nineteenth century in the context of the decay of the Ottoman Empire and the spread of
European economic power and direct political intervention. In the second half of the twentieth
century, while Arabs came to be identified as citizens of distinct nation-states, many still viewed the
borders as having been drawn either arbitrarily or with deliberately divisive intent by the European
powers and a handful of self-interested elites. The contradictory promises of the British and French
mandatory powers regarding Arab self-rule, on the one hand, and a Zionist homeland in Palestine,
on the other, culminating in the founding of an exclusionary Jewish state in 1948, were considered
the final betrayal by those powers and their successor, the United States. Subsequent constant
friction with Israel, the failure of the Western powers to provide justice or restitution to Palestinians,
and regular Western political and military intervention in the region keep these polities continually
off balance, and ironically reinforce the sense of cross-national Arab identity.
The economic dimensions embedded within this cultural-political framework are based on a
set of common social assumptions and structures. Although it seemed in the 1950s that there were
important differences between the Arab republics (e.g., Egypt after the abdication of King Farouk)
and the monarchies such as Jordan and Kuwait, all three adopted formal constitutions that
established parliamentary systems with elected representation and that defined the mutual
obligations between state and citizen. Even the World Bank has come to realize, after many
frustrated rounds of structural adjustment, that the distinctive features of the region cannot be so
easily undone and replaced with neoliberal institutions. As one recent work puts it, the differences
between the republics’ “commitment to radical populism” and the monarchies’ “paternalistic
rationale for statism” tended over the decades since independence toward “a measure of
convergence around an interventionist-redistributive form of social contract” (World Bank 2004:
23). This contract entails preferences for “redistribution and equity,” for planning and for “states
over markets in managing national economies,” and visions for a large “role of the state in the
provision of welfare and social services” and “of the political arena as an expression of the organic
unity of the nation, rather than as a site of political contestation” (World Bank 2004: 25). The World
Bank calls for a “new social contract” that respects regional culture and sensibilities, but uses this
notion to promote the familiar neoliberal reform agenda, such as flexible labor markets and
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precisely targeted social welfare (World Bank 2004: ch. 7).
In addition to these core features, intraregional economic relations are circumscribed by the
proximity to Europe in trade, investment and institutional structure, and by the global energy market
as driver of economic cycles for both the energy-exporters and those countries that export labor to
them. Economic integration comes, most importantly, from labor migration and other personnel
transfer (tourism, family links, vacation residence), remittances from émigré labor, cross-national
investment and aid and, to a lesser extent, intraregional trade. There is repeated and persistent
interest by regional economists in region-focused development that resonates with citizens across
national boundaries (e.g., Galal and Hoekman 2003). An important example is that the Arab
League’s proposal to Israel in 2002 for full recognition and a complete peace settlement with all
Arab countries, in exchange for a two-state solution to the Israel/Palestine conflict along the lines of
United Nations resolutions like 242, met with broad popular approval across the Arab World, for it
would have meant not only a final resolution of the exhausting Palestine question, but also peace
and prosperity for a more integrated region overall. Even the World Bank has come to recognize
this powerful motivation and has taken it up as another tool for promoting global integration (World
Bank 2003: ch. 1 and 7, and 2008a).
Viewed in this light, our representative cases of Egypt, Jordan and Kuwait entered their
post-war SSA when British domination ended and meaningful political independence was attained
(Egypt 1952, Jordan 1948, Kuwait 1961). The economic exigencies of nation building propelled
these countries toward some variant of “state-led development,” entailing institutional changes like
nationalization of natural resources, economic planning and infrastructure investment, importsubstitution industrialization, agrarian transformation, and changes in enterprise and labor law.
While the state occupied the commanding heights in investment, private capital played the role of a
junior partner, participating in but not dominating the direction of economic growth and social
change. This mode of development also required the cultivation of an educated middle class and
skilled and unskilled working classes to fill the new occupations of an expanding “modern”
economy, necessitating their incorporation into the political system in ways that would minimize
class conflict.
The state-led pattern of growth contained two deep contradictions, internal and external, that
grew more pressing and obvious as this SSA reached its limits in the 1980s. First, each regime in
our sample was formally committed to representative government, but the concentration of
economic power in the hands of the state and the myth that there are no class antagonisms fed into
authoritarian political tendencies. Alongside “state-led development” and in exchange for their
citizens’ acquiescence in limitations on political freedom, there blossomed a social contract. The
state promised public guarantees on the debt incurred by public and private enterprises, guarantees
of employment for all high school and, later, college graduates, and universal welfare programs
such as education, healthcare, housing and subsidies for consumer necessities. While much progress
was made in human development, fulfilling this social contract in terms of continuous growth of
employment and income would become increasingly difficult by the late 1980s, leading to erosion
2
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was delivered by a representative of the World Bank, Caio Koch-Weiser, then director of the Middle East Division.,
who hewed to the narrow neoliberal line at the time and spoke vociferously against the idea of the “social contract.”
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of political quiescence.
Second, the growth that took place during the boom years was less internally generated than
the planners anticipated. Instead, it was more dependent on a number of external circumstances,
such as high oil and phosphate prices in the world market, inter-country labor migration, and the
concurrent availability of intraregional or international aid and credit. Most of these conditions
would turn out to be unsustainable in the changing international economic climate of the 1980s.
Even as the Arab economies grew and developed in the 1960s and 1970s, a major
structural crisis was brewing in the West that would undermine the regional boom. By the early
1980s, recessionary conditions in the west led to the decline of raw material prices on world
markets, while the monetarist attack on inflation in Britain and the United States caused
international credit to become increasingly scarce and much more expensive. By the late 1980s, the
Arab countries’ efforts to sustain economic growth and meet social contract obligations in these
straitened international circumstances translated into rising government deficits, more international
borrowing at higher cost, and the inevitable foreign exchange crises, as earnings from exports failed
to keep pace with the cost of imports and debt service. Investment and productivity growth faltered
and aggregate economic growth slowed or even turned negative in some years.
Dependence on hydrocarbon-export revenues made this region more vulnerable to
fluctuations in the global economy, not more independent as their leaders had promised, and the
more dependent the country was on oil export revenues the worse was the crisis (see Figure 13.1 for
real GDP per capita growth 1975-2005). The costs of Dutch Disease3 in the region were generally
high, as relatively cheap imports had discouraged productive domestic investment during the
growth years. Subsequent stagnation in the standard of living for ordinary people and the slow
growth of job opportunities, even as demographic, education and healthcare outcomes continued to
improve through the 1980s, would feed into a deep political and social malaise and create particular
alienation among a growing educated workforce queuing for a limited number of jobs in the public
sector.
[Place Figure 13.1 about here]
Disgruntlement with the inadequacies of state-led development grew, as did popular disgust
with the intrusion of western culture along with western products into the region. But political
expression of dissent became increasingly difficult as authoritarian governments repressed secular
nationalist and socialist opposition movements. Led mainly by well-educated professionals, political
opposition adopted the form of “Islamism,” the legitimacy of which was harder for states to
challenge.4 This movement does not have much to do with the religion of Islam or Islamic
civilization, which have been highly variable from place to place and time to time over their 143

“Dutch Disease” was first recognized when The Netherlands experienced the cycle of rise and fall of oil prices and
accompanying fluctuations of foreign exchange revenue from North Sea oil exports. International oil transactions
are denominated in dollars. When oil prices are relatively high, the infusion of oil revenues tends to drive up the
value of the local currency. This makes imports relatively cheap and undermines the competitiveness of non-oil
exports, favoring a shift of investment out of agriculture and non-oil industry into other sectors. When oil prices fall
and the infusion of foreign currency abates, a less-diversified economy then faces rising relative prices for imports
and reduced capacity for domestic production and export of non-oil products.
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century-long history. Islamism’s contemporary importance is as a broad, variegated and clearly
modern political movement, most elements of which try peacefully and persistently to push their
governments to become more inclusive and responsive to citizens’ demands. In our cases as
elsewhere in the region, the backing of the United States and European Union have facilitated the
ruling regimes’ ability to curb serious challenges to their authority by this and other forms of
opposition. Such repression further fuels popular anger and, as with repressed opposition
movements in other places and times in history, has led the more extreme groups to take up
violence.
The Arab region’s “developmental” experience over the post World War II period not only
reflects but also is dialectically interwoven with the long wave of growth and stagnation in the
world economy and the subsequent turn to neoliberalism in the west. Whereas the US-led postwar
expansion of international trade initially stimulated growth throughout the periphery, with a time lag
of about ten years, the subsequent stagflation of the OECD economies, particularly the United
States, was then transmitted to the region through the mechanics of international commercial and
official lending, again with a time lag of about ten years. Efforts to transplant the purported solution
to stagflation, neoliberal ideology and “supply-side” policy as embodied in Thatcher’s and Reagan’s
programs in Britain and the United States, were conveyed to the region by the intervention of
international financial institutions (IFIs). By the early 1990s, the International Monetary Fund’s
stabilization agreements and the World Bank’s structural adjustment programs were being
administered to poorer debtor countries, such as Egypt and Jordan, and to crisis-stricken oil
exporters like Kuwait. The enforced openings to foreign capital, promotion of non-traditional
manufactured exports, and contraction of the government’s role in the economy exacerbated
internal contradictions and further undermined the social contract that was key to social peace in the
Arab World.
Given this overarching scheme, this chapter examines the specific forms of institutional
structure adopted in each of the three cases in the post-war SSA, including growth and
accumulation, state/capital relations, capital/labor relations, and regional integration. It then
considers the erosion of those structures in the 1980s, the cases’ experience in adapting to, and
resisting, the influence of neoliberalism after 1990, and the nature of the struggle to conceive a
viable and sustainable SSA for this region in the context of the worldwide crisis of neoliberalism.
POST-INDEPENDENCE SSA: STATE-LED DEVELOPMENT
Egypt, Jordan and Kuwait were defined as “nations” only in the twentieth century under
the tutelage of the British, who supported a monarchy in each area as it was wrested from local and,
more distantly, Ottoman control. Their self-identification as modern nation-states did not solidify
until the post-World War II era of national liberation in the colonized (Egypt) or “mandated”
(Jordan) or “protected” (Kuwait) territories of the British and other European empires.
The Egyptian monarchy was overthrown in a bloodless coup d’état in 1952, and between
1952 and 1954, when Gamal Abdul Nasser became president, a new form of republican Arab
nationalism came to the fore. British military forces continued to occupy the crucial Canal Zone
until 1956, when Nasser nationalized the Suez Canal to great popular acclaim in Egypt and across
the Arab World, the British were compelled to withdraw entirely, and the “Arab socialist”
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movement was born.
The seeds of Jordan’s emergence as a nation were planted after World War I, when the
British extended their mandate over Palestine east of the Jordan River to encompass what they
called Transjordan, created a kingdom in a territory the size of Indiana and appointed a
monarch.6 Nomadic pastoralists inhabited the eastern desert region, while settled agricultural
villages and animal herding predominated in the rainfed northwest hill country. Commercial
activity and other urban services were provided mainly by Palestinians, thanks to monopoly
licenses meted out by the mandatory authority. Jordan changed dramatically after its military
occupied the territory of eastern Jerusalem and the West Bank of Palestine in the war of 1948.
Overnight, Jordan’s population was tripled by its newfound control over one million
Palestinians, half of whom were refugees from the new state of Israel, and its economy was
quickly expanded and enlivened by the incorporation of the agricultural, small-industrial and
commercial life of that region of Palestine (Piro 1998: ch. 2).
Before the turn of the twentieth century, Kuwait had been a city-state with a distinct
role in the regional economy as a hub for fishing, pearling and trading, organized through its
natural harbor in the northwestern cul-de-sac of the Arab/Persian Gulf.7 But in the late nineteenth
century, trade shifted to suit the needs of the expanding British empire. In 1898, the emirate
(princedom) of Kuwait was created when a member of the leading shaikhly family, the AlSabahs, usurped power and secured his rule as Emir by signing a secret treaty with Britain giving
Kuwait “protectorate” status in exchange for Britain’s assuming control of its foreign affairs,
“defending” its “national” borders vis-à-vis the Ottomans, and later taking first dibs on oil
exploration (Pfeifer 2003).
Growth and Accumulation under the Post-Independence SSA
Egypt provides a clear and early example of the state-led development model, shaped by
a series of efforts dating back to the mid nineteenth century, when the ruling elite first initiated
industrial development to contend with European incursions. But it was under Gamal Abdel
Nasser in the 1950s and 1960s that a more thorough and planned program of infrastructure
investment, agricultural transformation, and import-substitution industrialization was undertaken,
including basic industries like iron and steel as well as consumer goods like processed foods,
textiles and automobile assembly. Complementary to this economic program, the government
delivered increased access by ordinary people to education, health care and other social services,
as well as what were then considered revolutionary steps toward greater equality through land
reform in the countryside and the growth of industrial jobs and organized labor in the cities
(Pfeifer and Posusney 2003).
The economic centrality of the state grew and, as indicated in Figure 13.2, government
expenditures rose to almost half of GDP while public capital expenditures rose to 20 percent of
5

With their allies France and Israel, Britain went to war with Egypt over this matter (the Suez War of 1956), but the
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hegemony in the region.
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government spending (Askari 2006:124). The construction of the Aswan High Dam was the
lynchpin of the program, generating enough electricity to serve the entire country’s consumption
and production needs. The overall plan was to facilitate intensification of agriculture and raise
productivity in cash crops, increasing rural income and saving, and thus, in the virtuous circle of
agriculture-led development, enhancing resources for investment, freeing labor to shift from
agriculture to industry and building the domestic market for growing domestic production.8
[Place Figure 13.2 about here]
However, the vision of autonomy from the world market was a chimera. The new
industries required the increased importation of capital equipment, technology and other inputs
in order to catch up quickly with modern production systems. In the early years, these imports
were paid for mainly by Suez Canal dues and by the export of cotton and other agricultural
products. In order to have the cotton to export and to have sufficient wheat and rice to feed the
population, the bulk of these cash crops was requisitioned by a government agency at prices
below those on the world market. The resale of the domestic portion helped to keep urban wages
low, facilitating industrial growth, and the resale of the exported portions at world prices helped
to bring in the foreign exchange needed to pay for essential imports. The closure of the Suez
Canal between 1967 and 1975 put the agricultural sector under more pressure to supply the
surplus for export earnings (Pfeifer and Posusney 2003).
Investment exceeded saving by a large margin every year from 1969 to 1989, just as
imports exceeded exports (World Bank 1991: 229), but the economy thrived due to Egypt’s key
place in the region’s economy and polity. The domestic “resource gap” was closed by inflows of
hard currency from several sources, including oil exports, Arab aid and investment, U.S. aid
linked to the 1979 peace treaty with Israel (half of which was military aid), tolls from the
reopened Suez Canal, renewed international tourism, and remittances from migrant workers, as
well as the build-up of debt to foreign lenders. With the infusion of these resources, Egypt
achieved record macroeconomic growth averaging 8.4 percenty per year for t1974-1985, while
investment reached a historic high at 25 percent of GDP, as did total factor productivity growth,
at 5 percent per year (Handy 1998: 5-8). Figure 13.3 indicates the surge in gross capital
formation. Egypt also fared comparatively well in attracting foreign direct investment, ranking
fourth among developing countries in total amount received during the 1981-1990 period (World
Bank 1991-92, v. 1: 25).
[Place Figure 13.3 about here]
Jordan’s defeat in the June War of 1967 enabled Israel to conquer and occupy the West
Bank and all of Jerusalem. On one hand, this was a great loss to Jordan, and, at first, wildly
disruptive. Another 300,000 Palestinian refugees from the occupied West Bank fled or were
driven east to Jordan. Palestinians and their descendents, many of whom became citizens of
Jordan, came to comprise more than 60 percent of the population, constituting both a burden and
a boon to the Jordanian economy. The poorer and less educated among them wound up in
refugee compounds (still extant in 2008) where education, healthcare and social services were
8

A synopsis of this vision of bottom-up development is provided in Richards and Waterbury (2008: 28-29).

8

provided by a special United Nations agency (UNRWA). The Jordanian system provided them
with public goods like transportation, the electricity grid and higher education, and incorporated
them into the economy (Piro 1998: ch. 2).
On the other hand, much of the Palestinian population was relatively well-educated and
occupationally skilled, as compared to the eastern Jordanian population. Many were able to get
work as skilled or professional labor, or to go into banking or government service, or to collect
enough capital to restart their economic activity. Furthermore, Palestinians made up the bulk of
the labor force that migrated to other Arab countries for work. This émigré labor became one of
Jordan’s main exports, and workers’ remittances served as a mainstay of family income and a
key source of foreign exchange as long as the economies of the Gulf grew (Pfeifer 2009).
Jordan’s economy not only recovered but thrived as its economic fate became more
tightly bound to that of its Arab neighbors. Real GDP per capita growth reached 15.8 percent per
year from 1975 to 1980, and was still high at 5.2 percent per year from 1980 to 1985 before the
regional crisis hit, while gross fixed investment rose to over one-third of GDP, as shown in
Figure 13.3. Unemployment reached a record low of 1.6 percent in 1976. Foreign grants, mainly
used for investment in public goods, were critical to long term growth. Grants from the Arab oil
states approximated 12% of GDP from 1975 to 1988, with debt finance running second at 10%
of GDP (Maciejewski and Mansur 1996:14, 16-17, 21).
As in Egypt, the Jordanian government poured public capital into physical infrastructure
and the “heavy industry” involved in extraction, processing and export of Jordan’s only known
natural resources, its phosphates, potash and other minerals. It also channeled investment into
small scale manufacturing and commercial agriculture, and the burgeoning system of universal
public education and near-universal access to healthcare. Commercial agriculture grew quickly
with the use of greenhouse and drip irrigation technologies to cultivate nontraditional fruits,
vegetables and flowers, and with the development of dairy and poultry farming. An important
part of the manufacturing sector was composed of factories processing these goods for export to
the region as well as for the domestic market. Tourism became another developing “industry”
built on natural, historical, and cultural resources (Pfeifer 2000, Piro 1998: ch.3).
Kuwait’s comparative advantage was transformed by the discovery of oil and the
beginnings of its extraction by foreign oil companies during the 1930s, thrusting it into the global
economy on entirely new terms. The Kuwaiti economy then developed with the oil industry at its
core and thrived under the U.S.-led post World War II expansion. By the 1950s, it had become a
rentier state, with the bulk of government revenues and more than half of GDP accounted for by
royalties (“rents”) paid by oil companies for the right to extract oil from Kuwaiti territory. In
1980, 71% of GDP originated in the oil sector, of which 68 percentage points were from crude
oil (EFB 1983(5): 6). In 1983, the GDP per capita of Kuwaiti citizens was $20,300 in current
dollars, in the same league as the United States and West European countries. Even the per capita
income of all residents of Kuwait (citizens and expatriates) was $12,646, in the middle-income
range of the world’s economies (EFB 1985(8): 6; EIUb 1991-92: 10).
The oil wealth generated unprecedented funds for both domestic and international
investment. Kuwait was the first Gulf country to take full control of its petroleum industry in the
1970s, paying £32 million to compensate Gulf Oil and the British Petroleum company (Day et al.
2007). In the 1970s, the savings rate rose to 50 percent of GDP, and investment and
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consumption, both public and private, soared. An index of gross fixed capital formation rose by a
factor of 4.5 between 1970 and 1983, to more than 20 percent of GDP (Al-Yousuf 1990:72, and
see also Figure 13.3). As in Egypt and Jordan, the Kuwaiti government invested heavily in
modern infrastructure, in equipping its own national companies with the technology to extract
and refine oil, and in universal education, healthcare, and welfare systems. In the boom years,
these were extended to the large populations of émigré workers and, in the case of the Palestinian
community, to their families as well. In addition, the Kuwaiti government set up the Kuwait
Fund for Arab Economic Development (KFAED), and cosponsored the Arab Fund for Economic
and Social Development, both lending for development and giving foreign aid to poor countries
in the Arab World, Africa and southern Asia.
State-Capital Relations under the Post-Independence SSA
In the first two decades after Nasser came to power in Egypt, private capital was
subordinated to the state and confined to the interstices among public sector enterprises.
However, the two wars with Israel in 1967 and 1973 were a great strain on the economy, and the
new regime of Anwar Sadat undertook to adjust to this reality with an opening to international
capital. Just as Egypt had been a pioneer in state-led development in the 1950s and 1960s, so did
the announcement of the new Egyptian “open door” economic policy (infitah) in 1974 mark the
first acknowledgement of the state-led model’s contradictions. But the effort to curry favor with
foreign capital was made without giving up the core role of the state and without major structural
change in the Egyptian economy. The state economic enterprises, social contract with labor and
other promises of the Nasser era were left intact, and queues began to form for public sector jobs
even as the growth of the public sector slowed (Richards 1991).
While a private domestic capitalist class remained in the shadow of the state, the infitah
helped to create a new wealthy comprador class, serving as the local agents for import/export
companies and as representatives and junior partners of foreign capital. The United States
became Egypt’s largest trading partner, source of foreign investment and aid donor. One
indication of the growing wealth of the comprador class and of the magnitude of remittances
from émigré labor was the sudden materialization of previously unrecorded savings that had
apparently long been stashed away outside of the state-regulated banking system, in the form of
deposits in the hot new “Islamic” investment companies that mushroomed in this era. Based on
the surprisingly large quantity of these savings, an Egyptian economist constructed an estimate
that actual gross national product might be up to twice its officially measured size (Oweiss 1990:
ch.1).
In Jordan, the state took the lead in the growing economy, but was less involved in direct
production than in Egypt, leaving more space to patronize and cultivate the entrepreneurial class
and to encourage its expansion into productive investment. Under the British Mandate, the small
Transjordanian economy had been linked to that of Palestine through a merchant class that
cooperated with the British and supported the king both financially and politically. After
independence in 1948, most of this elite moved to Amman and served to integrate the economies
of the East and West Banks more tightly. This class and the market it served were widened and
deepened by the two waves of Palestinian refugees that entered Jordan, in 1948 and 1967, but
retained its dependence on the monarchy for patronage (Moore 2000: 185).
The state organized investment in the core of the economy and let the private capitalist
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system grow up around it. In the first stage in the 1960s, the independent central bank was
created, which served actively in its first two decades to direct capital flow in the economy, but
otherwise left the banks alone to be “privately owned, prudently run, and profitable” (ERF 2005:
49). The Social Security Corporation was established and assigned the role of passive portfolio
investor to maximize returns to the pension fund system for private employees. In the second
stage in the 1970s, the financial system was deepened by the addition of two more institutions:
the Amman Financial Market (AFM), which became one of the most sophisticated stock markets
in the region, and the Jordan Investment Corporation (JIC), which was established to invest in
growth assets to fund civil service pensions. The JIC created state economic enterprises (SEEs)
to develop core industries in mining, electricity, water, transportation and communication,
airlines, ports and railroads, and public sector companies (PSCs) to process commodities such as
oil, phosphates and potash. The PSCs then issued shares for private purchase on the AFM
(Kanaan 2001: 190-92).
The private sector thrived during the expansion of the 1970s and Jordan’s per capita
income rose at 12 percent per year from 1975 to 1980 (Askari 2006: 97). Increased exports of
goods and of labor to the booming Gulf States and Saudi Arabia brought in surges of revenue
that fed domestic demand for housing, services, and locally made consumer goods, and Amman
became more important as a regional commercial and banking center as Beirut went into eclipse
during the Lebanese civil war of the 1970s and 1980s. Furthermore, the oil-rich countries
undertook programs of generous aid to the “frontline states” like Jordan for major infrastructure
projects.
Prior to the advent of the oil era, Kuwait’s ruling family, the Al-Sabahs, had been
considered “a first among equals” by the other elite merchant families whose ancestors had
settled the area, such heritage being the defining feature of legal citizenship. Oil revenue,
however, elevated the ruling family’s political status by allowing it to become financially
independent of its merchant-elite citizens. In exchange for political acquiescence, the rulers
created a patronage system that guaranteed the privileged economic status of their clients, the
merchants, by supporting them directly and preserving a residual vitality for the now-truncated
private-sector economy. For example, the government essentially gave away the rights to
undeveloped land that would become very valuable in the soon-to-be-built modern and expanded
Kuwait City, and made generous subsidies available to start new types of small scale private
business in the real estate, commercial, import/export and even agricultural sectors (Pfeifer
2003).
Given Kuwait’s relatively small absorptive capacity, the government used surplus oil
revenues to fund overseas investment, foreign aid, and international loans. In 1953, the Kuwaiti
finance ministry set up The General Reserve Fund (the original “sovereign wealth fund”) to be
administered by the Kuwait Investment Office in London to generate a second source of rentier
income. Another mainly international portfolio was created in 1976, the unique Reserve Fund for
Future Generations. These funds purchased shares in large Western companies. As of 1990, the
two funds together were estimated to be worth $100 billion, yielding average annual returns of
five percent (Day et al. 2007). From 1980 on, annual gross national income was between 15 and
20 percent greater than gross domestic product (Pfeifer 2003, Figure 1).
Capital/Labor Relations under the Post-Independence SSA
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Virtually all countries in the Arab region underwent a profound transformation in the
class structure as they developed in the post-independence era. In Egypt, Jordan and Kuwait, part
of the national economic project entailed creation of a parliamentary system with regular
contested elections, and, in the case of Egypt, elections for the head of state. It also entailed
recognizing the contributions of the working classes to the country’s development and
compensating workers, at least in the large productive organizations (50+ employees), with
regular wage increases, pension and health benefits, and, in the case of Egypt, profit-sharing.
These were supplemented with universal subsidies for basic necessities and low-cost housing and
guarantees of employment in the public sector to those with high school or college diplomas.
Formation of unions was legal, but they were closely supervised by the government, with
“elected” leaders accountable more to the state than to the rank and file and, in Egypt, no right to
strike (Posusney 1997).
Strikes took place in Egypt anyway, under the leadership of rank-and-file activists, in
spite of the police repression which intensified during the 1980s crisis years under the Mubarak
regime. These actions were sometimes quite militant and political in their challenge to
management and to the government (Posusney 1997). Such movements, especially when allied
with political parties or organizations, had some impact on government policy and put
constraints on the freedom of capitalists and landlords to ignore workers’ rights under the stateled import-substitution regime and the subsequent opening to foreign capital. The political left
(in various forms) helped lead or joined these movements, but was either repressed (parties made
illegal, newspapers closed) or co-opted by the state with its close control over formal leadership
of the unions, effectively preventing the organization of an enduring structure of opposition
(Beinin 2002).
Effective organizing of labor was also undermined by the structural fragmentation of the
working classes. The combination of rural-urban migration, rising levels of unemployment and
underemployment, the growth of the informal sector, and opportunities for labor migration
fractured the potential unity of workers’ organizations and “weakened the position of working
people in the coalitions that supported authoritarian-populist regimes pursuing state-led ISI”
(Beinin 2002: 117). About 3.5 million Egyptians, including professional, skilled, and unskilled
workers and peasants, migrated for some period during the 1973-1985 boom to the oil-exporting
countries, especially Libya, Saudi Arabia, and Iraq. This relieved a potentially explosive
unemployment crisis in the 1980s and raised the standard of consumption and saving. Figure
13.4 shows the magnitude of remittances. As Beinin put it,
In Egypt, transfers of migrant workers constituted the single largest source of foreign
exchange, amounting to 12 percent of the gross domestic product in the mid-1980s. By
1988, at least 20 percent of the labor force [had] worked abroad [at some time], and
annual official transfers of migrant workers reached about $3.2 billion; unofficial
transfers were estimated at [an additional] $2 billion to $4 billion (Beinin 2002: 117).
[Place Figure 13.4 about here]
Jordan has long been called a “liberal monarchy” because the regime usually allowed
some diversity of representation in its elected parliament. However, the monarch could dismiss
parliament at will, ignore the laws it passed and make policy by decree. Indeed the king banned
all political parties from 1957 to 1992, preventing trade unions and other civil society groups
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from building explicit political affiliations or external support (Carroll 2003: 271-273).
In the context of state-led development, trade unions were legally recognized, and, as in
Egypt, Jordan’s workers were considered part of the nation-building coalition, and were granted
legal protections against job loss. Temporary work contracts automatically became permanent
when they were renewed. Workers could appeal arbitrary firing and delay it for a long time while
the appeal was considered by a government-appointed labor board. Firms were required to give
advance warning of possible mass layoffs, which the government could abnegate, no matter what
the firm’s profit or loss situation. However, the trade-off for these privileges in the formal sector
was that unions were subject to government interference in their internal affairs, their top officers
were tightly tied to the regime, and the right to strike was strictly constrained (Posusney 2007).
The definition of the working classes in Jordan became more complicated in the era of
strong economic growth, as Jordan became both an exporter and an importer of labor. While
educated Jordanians left to work in the Gulf, the lower tiers of the economy were filled by
agricultural, manufacturing and service workers from poorer Arab countries such as Egypt and,
increasingly, poorer regions like South Asia. This too made it difficult for labor to achieve longterm unified organizing and political coherence vis-à-vis the state and private employers.
Kuwait’s history as a long-lived city-state prior to the advent of oil led to a unique postindependence political structure. A constitutional monarchy with a formal commitment to the
separation of executive, legislative and judicial powers, its legitimacy has no connection with
religion and there is little influence of shariah on contemporary law. Although the Emir can
suspend the constitution and shut down the National Assembly, there is a lively political culture,
with vigorous debates among elected members of a variety of political persuasions, such as Arab
nationalists and Islamists of various stripes, in parliament and at the diwaniyya, evening
gatherings at the homes of political notables where the issues of the day are freely discussed. The
press too can be shut down by the Emir, but it is privately owned and competitive and has often
been critical of the regime. For labor, this relative liberality meant that Kuwait was the only
monarchy in the Gulf that allowed unions and that tolerated, and even supported, political
organizing among Palestinians. For example, the Kuwaiti Teachers’ Federation often backed the
relatively militant (and mostly female) Palestinian Teachers’ Federation (Pfeifer 2009).
While Kuwaiti/Palestinian solidarity was tolerated, there was little of the social and
political integration among workers of various backgrounds that would have made long-term,
coherent organizing possible. Kuwaiti society was strictly stratified into endogamous layers, both
among Kuwaitis themselves and, separately, among the expatriate communities, layered each in
turn by longevity of residence and their contributions to building the modern Kuwaiti economy,
with Palestinians the best established, largest and economically most significant community
(Pfeifer 2003).9
The population of Kuwait more than doubled between 1975 and 1990, from 995,000 to
2,130,000. In the first decade, growth came disproportionately from the resident expatriates,
whose share of total population rose from 52.5% in 1974 to a peak of 72.3% in 1985, up to
500,000 of whom were Palestinians. The non-Kuwaiti component of the labor force grew from
70% in 1975 to a peak of 85% in 1990. However, in the mid-1980s, a new nationalistic policy
9

The story of the work and lives of Palestinians in Kuwait is documented in Ghabra 1987, especially pp. 39-52.
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was adopted, promoting the “Kuwaitization” of employment at least at the professional and
technical levels, and making it more difficult for expatriate workers to remain in Kuwait for long
periods or for their families to accompany them.10 By 1990, prior to any hint of invasion by Iraq,
the balance had been shifted consciously so that the higher-paid, more politically nettlesome
Arabs were reduced to less than 50 percent of the expatriate labor force, and the majority came to
be made up made up instead of South Asians (Pfeifer 2003).
Human Development, Income Distribution and Poverty
The three countries, like the Arab region in general, showed significant improvement in
human development, including female development, over the whole period from independence
to 2005 (see Figure 13.5 for the Human Development Index, 1975-2005). In education, for
example, Egypt began from a very low base, with an illiteracy rate over 70 percent in 1966. Its
Human Development Index rose 27 points from 1975 to 2005, one of the biggest increases in the
world over that 30-year period, ending with an illiteracy rate of 29 percent. Jordan’s HDI rose by
about 12 points from 1980 to 2005, ending at a value of 77 (rank 86), leaving Jordan “more
developed than rich,” in that its HDI rank exceeded its 2005 GDP rank by 11 points. Jordan’s
education system is one of the best in the region, yielding a literacy rate of 100 percent for
women aged 15-24 in 2002. Kuwait’s HDI rose 13 points from 1975 to 2005, ending at 89 (rank
33), but with the caveat that it was still “richer than developed,” in so far as its GDP per capita
rank in 2005 was higher than its HDI rank by 12 points. One of Kuwait’s biggest achievements
was to bring girls’ school enrollment up to and beyond par with that of boys (United Nations
Development Program 2007/08).
[Figure 13.5 about here]
The Arab region had lower levels of inequality than most other regions of the developing
world such as Latin America, South Asia and Africa, and lower rates of abject poverty than
countries of comparable income levels. While state income tax systems were poorly developed
or enforced, revenues from public-sector exports, taxes on services like tourism, and tariffs on
imports were important sources of public funding for common services. Relative equity in
consumption was promoted by public sector subsidies on commodities and wage and benefit
policies, as well as well-resourced Islamic and other private charitable institutions that help to
provide healthcare, education and welfare services to the poorer parts of the population.11
The crisis years of the later 1980s and early 1990s were a period of rising income poverty
for both Egypt and Jordan, and of falling average income for Kuwait as a whole, but the situation
improved in the later 1990s as economic growth resumed (World Bank 2006: Table A1). As of
2000-2002, Jordan’s GINI index for consumption was 0.39 and Egypt’s 0.34 (World Bank 2006:
Table A2). In 2005, Egypt’s and Jordan’s Human Poverty Index (HPI-1) values of 20 and 6.9,
respectively, and their ranks (61 and 11) were significantly better than their HDI and GDP per
10

The policy targeted the Arab community in general, and Palestinians in particular, who were the only group that
lived in families in well-established communities.
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We have no data for Kuwait for either income distribution or poverty. It is well known, however, that there is
dramatic inequality between Kuwaiti citizens and permanent residents, on the one hand, and the bulk of immigrant
workers, on the other hand, in terms of income from work, investment and government largesse. However,
consumption is much more equitably distributed insofar as any resident may shop for a broad array of commodities
in the “cooperative” grocery stores and buy gasoline and other petroleum-derived products at government-owned
gas stations, all at subsidized prices.
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capita ranks (UNDP 2007/08).
Economic Relations within the Regional SSA
Economic relations among Arab countries entailed direct budgetary transfers, long-term
low-interest development loans, private investment, trade, and the migration of labor.
Direct Aid. Outright budgetary support was provided by the Arab oil exporters to the
“confrontation states” to sustain them and compensate them in the conflict with Israel. From
1963 to 1966, Egypt received $234.5 million in government-to-government transfers, including a
grant from KFAED of $27.5 million to widen and deepen the Suez Canal. Between the 1967 war
and the Camp David Accords in 1978 (after which Egypt made peace with Israel and was
subjected to an Arab League boycott), Egypt received up to $17 billion in aid from Arab oil
exporters, including $162 million from Kuwait alone between 1967 and 1970 (Feiler 2003: 40).
From 1973 to 1988, Jordan received an average of 43 percent of government revenue from
external aid and loans, with a high of 53.4 percent in 1980 at the peak of the oil boom (Brand
1994, Table 1: 44-45). As one of the most generous donors, Kuwait was motivated by more than
altruism, in so far as “…the substantial Kuwaiti aid payments to Jordan were in large part aimed
at reinforcing the security and military apparatus of a politically like-minded and supportive
state” (Brand 1994: 123).
Development Aid, Loans and Investment. Oil export revenues were used for
development by both the oil exporters and poorer Arab nations, through the region-based
recycling of petrodollars. Figure 13.3 shows similar trajectories for gross capital formation in
Egypt and Jordan from 1960 to 1975, and in Egypt, Jordan and Kuwait from 1975 to 1987.
Total Arab investment in Egypt through 1985 was $4.55 billion, $2 billion of which was
deposited directly into the Central Bank for public sector investment, with the remainder
designated for project-specific development aid and private for-profit enterprise (Feiler 2003:
93). From 1962 to 1989, the length of the post-independence SSA and its erosion, Jordan
received $401 million in development loans from the Arab oil exporters and $2.154 billion in
cash contributions for various projects (Brand 1994: 149). Kuwait’s contributions to total loans
to Jordan rose throughout the 1960s and 1970s, to a peak of 6% in 1983. Most of these funds
went into infrastructure projects, such as the phosphate, potash and fertilizer industries, thermal
power, BirZeit University in Ramallah, West Bank municipal services, the port at Aqaba, the
Amman water system, and the Jordan Valley Authority, including agricultural irrigation (Brand
1994, Tables 1 and 11: 44-45 and 130).
Private investment from Kuwait to Jordan mainly took the form of joint ventures but
accounted for only a few percentage points of Kuwait’s overseas investments (Brand 1994: 143,
147). These ventures focused on real estate, including both housing and agricultural land
development, commerce, tourism, bus transportation services, and food production such as dairy,
poultry and fishing. Manufacturing investment was focused on processed foods, fodder, and
fertilizer, mainly for export to the region.
Trade. Jordan’s relations with Egypt were cool until the common experience of the 1967
war losses brought them closer. After 1970, Jordan sought to expand exports to Egypt’s growing
domestic market, in order “to overcome some of the diseconomies of scale that had hindered
Jordanian attempts at domestic commercial and industrial expansion,” and to enhance its
regional political security through economic links (Brand 1994: 243). However, Jordan’s imports
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from Egypt averaged only 2 percent of all imports in the 1970s, while exports to Egypt averaged
about 3 percent of all exports, with Jordan running a consistent trade deficit with Egypt. While
Jordan purchased less than 2 percent of total imports from Kuwait, e.g., 1.7 percent in 1973, its
exports to Kuwait were significant, e.g., 11 percent of all exports in 1973, and Jordan maintained
a trade surplus with Kuwait throughout the 1970s (Brand 1994, Tables 7 and 8: 78-79).
Jordan was the first Arab country overtly to break the embargo on Egypt in 1983, in order
to facilitate Egypt’s material support of Iraq in the Iran-Iraq war and to help Jordan’s private
sector replace shrinking Iraqi markets with Egyptian customers. Many joint ventures were
discussed but only two significant projects were realized, the Aqaba-Nuwaybi line in 1975, for
maritime shipping between the Suez Canal and Jordan’s Red Sea port, and a joint development
bank in 1984, with branches in both countries (Brand 1994: 243-244, 248-249, 255-256).
Émigré Labor and Remittances. At the zenith in 1982-83, about 23 percent of the
Egyptian labor force, or 2.9 million workers, were employed abroad. Their remittances amounted
to $3.98 billion in 1984, with a cumulative total for the 1974-1984 period of $22 billion (Feiler
2003: 100, 111, 116), more than ten times the value of Kuwait’s direct investment in Egypt
around the same time. Egyptian labor played an important role in Kuwait, ranging from 150,000
workers in 1978 to 200,000 in 1982-83, and in Iraq during the eight-year-long Iran-Iraq war,
involving a total of up to 1.25 million, mainly farm, laborers (Feiler 2003: 101, 244).
Jordan sent many professionals, teachers, and military advisers to Kuwait and Kuwait
sent its own students to Jordan to be trained as teachers and military officers. There were at least
350,000 Jordanian émigré workers (mostly of Palestinian origin) in Kuwait in 1985 (Brand 1994:
134). During the same era, and despite the embargo on Egypt, Egyptian labor continued to work
in Jordan, mainly in agriculture and construction. As of 1987, there were 250,000 Egyptian
workers in Jordan, a number that then declined with the economic crisis of 1988-89 (Brand 1994:
264-265). As shown in Figure 13.4, at their first peak in 1986, Jordan’s receipts of remittances
reached almost $1.2 billion and Jordan’s payments of remittances reached $247 million.
EROSION OF THE STATE-LED SSA AND THE ADVENT OF NEOLIBERALISM
By the mid-1980s, as oil prices and oil revenues declined, the internal contradictions of
state-led development and the region’s dependence on oil revenues and labor remittances came
together to generate a crisis. The core symptom was the failure to sustain productivity growth.
An exercise in growth accounting showed that “the MENA region as a whole has experienced
the lowest contribution of total factor productivity to economic growth in comparison with the
rest of the [world’s] regions,” and that TFP’s contribution to growth was actually negative on
average over the whole of the 1960-1997 period (Makdisi et al. 2007: 48). Similarly, average
per-worker real GDP growth rates for Kuwait were negative for the whole of the 1965-2004
period, while Jordan’s fell from 8.24 percent in the 1975-1984 decade to minus 3.13 percent in
the 1985-1994 decade, and Egypt’s fell from 6.49 to 0.78 (Esfahani 2007: 63). The main
difference in severity among these results seems to be due to the degree of dependence on
capital-intensive oil extraction or employment in the Gulf as the basis of economic growth.
In Egypt’s case, four core internal contradictions came to the surface. First, instead of
following through on the promise of agricultural led (“bottom up”) growth based on the land
reform and Aswan High Dam that would have enabled peasants’ income and saving to rise, the
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state turned to paying very low, controlled prices for requisitioned crops like cotton, in order to
sell them for higher prices on the world market. Peasants shifted to producing uncontrolled
crops, the most famous being berseem, a kind of clover fed to cattle, in response to rising urban
demand for meat. As Egypt became a net importer of food grains and import costs rose, this
tactic for increasing foreign exchange was self-thwarting. Second, the state’s industrialization
strategy relied on importing western technology wholesale in large chunks of capital-intensive
investment. This caused early growth to be based on additions to capital and labor, without much
technological innovation or long-term expansion in the demand for industrial labor. The
combination of the first and second factors led to rapid rural-urban migration and emergence of a
growing informal sector.
Furthermore, in contrast to the East Asian model -- Egypt is often compared
unflatteringly to South Korea -- ISI protection for domestic industry was allowed to go on for too
long, with little expectation that these firms would “pay back” the support with innovation that
would make their products more competitive in world markets and earn their own share of
foreign exchange. And, finally, the promise of jobs in the public sector for all graduates, and the
job protections that formal sector labor had won as part of the state-led social compact, led to
overstaffing, wasted time and resources, and declines in real compensation as inflation overtook
nominal wage growth.
Consequently, Egypt’s GDP growth, national saving and public spending all plummeted
in the later 1980s. Real per capita GDP growth fell from 4.7 percent per year during the 19801985 period to 0.3 percent per year from 1985 to 1990 (Askari 2006: 97). Domestic saving
seemed to evaporate overnight with the collapse of several pseudo “Islamic” investment
companies which ran Ponzi schemes with the investors’ purchases of shares, undermining
confidence in the private sector. At the same time shortages of foreign currency to finance
imports of industrial inputs and food fueled the debt crisis that struck Egypt as elsewhere in the
Third World. External debt rose to more than 100 per cent of GDP in 1985. By 1990 the
government had cut wages in the public sector and real wages in manufacturing had fallen below
their 1970s levels. Unemployment and poverty rose, even as the government cut subsidies on
necessities like bread and fuel (Beinin 2002: 129-130).
This combination of internal crisis and the new reality of declining oil revenues and
remittances made the Egyptian state more vulnerable to pressure from the importers and
financiers who had flourished under the infitah since 1974 and also more susceptible to pressure
from the Bretton Woods institutions. Prior to 1990, the Washington Consensus had not been
making headway in Egypt due to resistance from organized labor and the possibility of escape
for émigré workers. However, “cancellation of nearly half of Egypt’s $55 billion foreign debt in
return for participating in the U.S.-led coalition against Iraq in the [1991] Gulf War opened the
way to concluding a successful agreement with the IMF and gave the regime sufficient political
capital to begin the long-delayed privatization of public-sector enterprises” (Beinin 2002: 116117).
During the same time period, Jordan experienced two major shocks that left its
economy in disarray. First, the oil price declines of 1983 and 1986-1988 sent the oil-exporting
economies into recession. That led them to reduce their demand for émigré labor, curb their
imports of Jordanian products, and cut their foreign aid. Unemployment rose to 10 percent in

17

1988 and by 1990 manufacturing wages here, as in Egypt, had fallen to levels below that of the
early 1970s (Beinin 2002: 129-130). In 1989, Jordan experienced its first massive bread riots as
the government cut subsidies. Real GDP per capita fell by 3.9 percent per year from 1985 to
1990 and debt rose to more than 200 percent of GDP in 1990 (Askari 2006: 97, 166). As foreign
exchange reserves fell precipitously, Jordan reached the limits of its ability to borrow on the
international markets, and the dinar had to be devalued by 60 percent, severely curbing the
country’s ability to import the final and intermediate goods it did not produce itself.
The second major shock came with the Gulf crisis of 1990-91. Jordan’s trade with Iraq,
its major trading partner, fell by half as war and then economic sanctions took effect.
Furthermore, the Gulf country allies halted their aid to and trade with Jordan in retaliation for its
stance and expelled large numbers of expatriate workers, especially Palestinians, many of whom
had nowhere to go but Jordan. Thus remittances plunged at the same time that the domestic labor
force suddenly bulged with an additional 60,000 to 70,000 workers, half of whom were
unemployed in 1991. The unemployment rate for 1991 is variously estimated to have risen to
between 14.4 and 25 percent. Real GDP per capita grew by less than one percent per year from
1990 to 1995 (Askari 2006: 97) and, while the number of registered private enterprises had
grown from 1,990 to 4,349 between 1987 and 1992 (Kanaan 2001: 192), the capitalist class was
weak and demoralized and did not take up the chance to assert its interests more strongly vis-avis the state (Moore 2000: 185–191).
Like Jordan, Kuwait experienced several sharp reversals in the 1980s. The world-wide
recessions of 1980-1982, the shift toward alternative fuels and conservation in the oil-consuming
countries, and the entry of more non-OPEC suppliers into the oil market all contributed to a fall
in the demand for OPEC oil and falling prices. Kuwait’s “real” oil revenues (nominal revenues
deflated by an import price index) were 13 percent lower in 1982 than their 1974 value. Oil
prices fell again in 1986 and in 1988, and Kuwait’s oil revenues plunged once more, to 58
percent of their 1974 value (Al-Yousuf 1990: 6-8). Economic growth then plummeted, with real
GDP per capita falling by 9.4 percent per year from 1985 to 1990. As Figure 13.3 shows, by
1990 gross capital formation had slipped to about 11 percent of GDP. Gross domestic saving was
a tiny 4 percent of GDP, while, in contrast, gross national saving was 17 percent, indicating that
capital was being held abroad rather than invested inside the country (Askari 2006: 97, 100,
110).
The sense of demoralization in Kuwait was underpinned by the failure of the non-oil
commodity sectors to grow rapidly. Excluding petroleum refining and a few essentially
European “model firms,” real value added per worker fell from KD 2,836 in 1976 to KD 2,312
in 1984 (Al-Sabah 1988: 26). This poor performance was due partly to the Dutch Disease realsector hangover from the oil boom years. It was also due to the financial-sector problems based
on the Souk al-Manakh stock market crash of 1982 and subsequent liquidity crises, which
undermined confidence in real private investment in the domestic economy, even though the
government stepped in to buy up both stocks and bank shares at much-higher-than-market prices
(Looney 1992).
Planners and consulting economists repeatedly proposed reform programs intended to
tackle Kuwait’s “structural problems” and reduce its dependence on both oil revenues and
expatriate workers. The key idea was to shift resources to favor productivity-enhancing, “high

18

value-added” ventures at home and abroad, such as financial service and industrial -design and
engineering, to be organized and managed by well-educated and highly-skilled Kuwaitis (AlSabah 1988), to encourage private entrepreneurial activity and to move the economy toward a
more East Asian model of development.12 Instead, Kuwait intensified its pursuit of the old
familiar course that had brought it wealth and success in the 1960s and 1970s. In violation of its
OPEC quota, and in competition with other OPEC members similarly seeking to cheat on their
agreement, Kuwait stepped up oil production, from June of 1989 until the disastrous invasion by
Iraq in August 1990 (EIUb 1991-92: 13), and replaced the expatriate labor force with a less
expensive one after the restoration in 1991. See Figure 13.4 for the sharp dip in remittances
received by Jordan and remittances paid out by Kuwait from 1988 to 1991.
Disintegration and Reconstruction of Regional Economic Relations, 1985-2000
The crisis years of the later 1980s and early 1990s were a period of rising income poverty
for both Egypt and Jordan, and of falling average income for Kuwait as a whole, but the situation
improved in the later 1990s as economic growth resumed, although at a lower rate than in the
1970s and early 1980s (World Bank 2006: Table A1). The crisis years of the later 1980s also
challenged the structure of intraregional economic links. Links were restructured in the 1990s,
but the process affected Egypt, Jordan and Kuwait quite differently. While Gulf Cooperation
Council (GCC)13 links were greatly reduced with Egypt during the boycott years, they were
restored in the later 1980s and strengthened in the 1990s. For Jordan, on the other hand, GCC
links, with Kuwait in particular, weakened steadily in the later 1980s and were ruptured almost
entirely in the 1990s. Figure 13.3 shows that the paths of gross capital formation diverged widely
among Egypt, Jordan and Kuwait during the years of crisis and stagnation, 1988-1997, in
contrast to the synchronization that existed before and was to appear again after this depressed
decade.
Aid. Arab aid to Egypt was negative from 1981 to 1985, due to the boycott, but resumed
from 1986 to 1989 on a much smaller scale than in the 1960s and 1970s, with a total of about
$210.5 million over those four years (Feiler 2003, Table 6.1: 233). Meanwhile, Egypt received
aid of about $2 billion per year from the United States after the peace treaty with Israel in 1979.
In reward for its participation in the war to expel Iraqi forces from Kuwait, Egypt
received a record amount of aid, $4.8 billion, in 1990-1991, of which $3 billion came from the
Gulf oil exporters, and the cancellation of $13 billion of its international debt. Arab aid then
declined again due to low oil revenues, to a grand total of just $8 billion over the 1995-2001
period, while U.S. aid continued at about $2 billion annually. Despite Kuwait’s continued
straitened circumstances, it was responsible for about 15 percent of that Arab aid and debt
cancellation, and, in 1999, KFAED provided Egypt with a big boost, $50.8 billion in
development loans, for projects involving land improvement, power transmission, paper and
printing, a drainage system and the Social Development Fund (Feiler 2003: 232-242).
12

Two of the researchers involved in the project, Lance Taylor and Alice Amsden are well known for their critique
of the IMF/World Bank formula and their analyses of the success of the various East Asian development strategies.
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The Gulf Cooperation Council was founded in 1980, with the support of the United States, as a grouping of Arab
Gulf countries opposing the Islamic Republic of Iran and supporting Iraq in the Iraq-Iran War (the “first Gulf War”).
Comprised of six countries, Bahrain Kuwait, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates and, a bit later, Oman,
it subsequently evolved to have economic dimensions as well, similar to the European Economic Community.
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Jordan received a declining share of government revenues from external aid and loans in
the 1980s, down from a peak of 53.4 percent in 1980 to 28.8 percent in 1988 while Kuwait’s
share of foreign loans to Jordan fell from a peak of 6 percent in 1983 to 1.3 percent in 1988
(Brand 1994, Table 1: 44-45). Furthermore, in response to Jordan’s attempt to remain “neutral”
after Iraqi forces occupied Kuwait in 1990, Kuwait withdrew its recognition and support, and the
two countries did not reconcile until 1999.
Investment. Arab investment in Egypt increased in the later 1980s, rising to 23 percent
of total Arab investment in 1990 and accounting for 12.5 percent of private FDI into Egypt in
that year (Feiler 2003: 240). Private Arab capital continued to flow into Egypt in the later 1990s,
with Kuwait responsible for about 20 percent per year, e.g. $17.6 million out of a total inter-Arab
FDI of $88.2 million in 1999. In 1999, there were 1,799 Arab companies in Egypt, with a
registered capital stock of $16.28 billion, including the Kharafi Investment Group from Kuwait,
accounting for $725 million. These companies were involved in a diversified range of activities
including industry, agriculture, banks, transport services, investment companies and free zone
commerce (Feiler 2003: 241).
Private Egyptian capital also flowed out into other Arab countries in the later 1990s. Out
of a total Egypt-Arab flow of $4 billion from 1985 to 2000, $1.1 billion went to Kuwait alone,
reinforcing Egypt’s special relationship with Kuwait (Feiler 2003: 243).
Trade. Jordan’s trade with Egypt declined during the core boycott years from 1979 to
1983, with imports from Egypt falling to 0.4% of all imports and exports to Egypt falling to 1.2
percent of all exports. After Jordan abandoned the boycott, both imports and exports rose again
(to 1 percent and 2.2 percent of total imports and exports, respectively, by 1988) and Jordan
actually ran a trade surplus with Egypt in one year, 1987. Jordan’s imports from Kuwait became
somewhat more important in the 1980s, rising from 0.5 percent of all imports in 1984 to 2.2
percent in 1988, as it shifted away from dependence on Iraq for fuels. However, its exports to
Kuwait declined in importance, falling from 11 percent of total exports in 1973 to 4 percent in
1984 and 3 percent in 1988. Jordan incurred a trade deficit with Kuwait for the first time in 1987
and 1988 (Brand 1994, Tables 7 and 8: 78-79).
Tourism. Tourism is an important intraregional phenomenon. World Bank indices show
that Jordan and Egypt underperformed relative to their potential in 2000 on all measures of trade
integration (the trade-to-GDP ratio, exports to GDP ratio, product diversification, intra-regional
trade, non-oil exports and FDI), but they performed higher than their potential in tourism (World
Bank 2003: 43, 48, 49, 72-74, 76-78). Tourism receipts averaged 4 percent of GDP for Egypt in
1998-2000, 9.3 percent for Jordan (World Bank 2003, Appendix Table 4: 234). In 1998-99,
Arabs from other countries constituted 56 percent of all overnight visitors, including tourists, to
Jordan.14
Émigré Labor and Remittances. The crisis years of the late 1980s saw a sharp
reduction in the demand for specifically Arab labor in the Gulf, as those countries tried to place
their own citizens in higher-echelon occupations and to expand the proportion of non-Arabs in
the lower echelons. As indicated in Figure 13.4, remittances received by Jordan fell by about half
from 1985 to 1990, while Kuwaiti payments leveled off and then dropped precipitously in those
14
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years as well.
Although more than 700,000 Egyptians returned from the Gulf countries in 1990-91 in
the wake of the Iraqi occupation, their numbers revived, with about 2 million Egyptians working
in other Arab countries in the later 1990s. Of those, about 227,000 worked in Jordan in 1999
(Feiler 2003: 244-245). As can be seen in Figure 13.4, remittances leaped up in 1990-91 as
Egyptians were recruited on a temporary basis to support the war effort against Iraq, and then
settled into a normal range of between $3.2 and 3.6 billion per year from 1994 to 1999.
Up to one third of the Jordanian labor force had been working abroad in 1990, but 60,000
to 70,000 workers were expelled from Kuwait and other Gulf countries, and their families, most
of whom had fled the war zone, were not allowed to return. As a result, on the one hand,
remittances did not grow from 1991 to 1995, hovering at about $1 billion per year (Figure 13.4),
but, on the other hand, gross capital formation leaped up from 1993 to 1995, and remained above
its 1990 level until 1998, as returnees established businesses and invested in real estate (Figure
13.3). Based on the increased size of the labor force, a growing number of Jordanians worked
abroad (but not in Kuwait) in the later 1990s, and remittances to Jordan again grew from about
$1 billion to 1.5 billion.
For both Jordan and Egypt, workers’ remittances remained a crucial source of national
income. Remittances per capita, at an annual average of $355 and $60, respectively, in 19982000, significantly exceeded FDI per capita, $72 and $18, and aid flows per capita, $98 and $26,
in those same years (World Bank 2003, Appendix Table 5: 236).
Accommodation and Resistance to the Neoliberal Agenda
In the 1990s, Egypt, Jordan and Kuwait were repeatedly urged to structurally adjust their
institutions to match Washington Consensus requirements, that is to stabilize by reducing
government spending, privatize state economic enterprises, and liberalize foreign trade, access
for foreign investment and labor law. Failing to accommodate in full and yielding no coherent
version of a neoliberal SSA, they generated sometimes bizarre results that contradicted
Washington Consensus expectations. For example, Jordan’s domestic capitalist class responded
to almost full privatization by lobbying the regime to pursue a “developmental state” model
(Carroll 2003: 268).
Rebalancing State/Capital Relations. Egypt reduced the ratio of government spending
to GDP by half from 1985 to 2004, cutting public employment from 39 to 30 percent of the labor
force. The government liquidated holdings in 189 of 314 state economic enterprises, halving
employment in that sector from 1.08 million employees (about 6 percent of the labor force) to
less than one-half million (Carana Corporation 2002: 8-11). Stock market capitalization rose
from 35.6 to 105 percent of GDP, the official unemployment rate fell from 11.7 to 8.3 percent
and employment in the formal private sector rose 6 percentage points to 27 percent.
Unexpectedly, however, the share of the formal private sector in GDP actually decreased
between 2000 and 2007, from 70.7 to 62.3 percent, and private ownership became more
concentrated as the number of companies listed and traded on the stock exchange fell by about
50% (American Chamber of Commerce in Egypt 2008). Furthermore, by 2006, the informal
sector had expanded to absorb 75 percent of new labor force entrants, accounted for 61 percent
of actual employment, and produced between one third and one half of officially measured GDP
(Nassar 2008: 6, Assaad 2007: 1, 12-13).

21

Kuwait reduced its government-spending-to-GDP ratio from more than 50 percent during
the 1985-1995 decade to less than 40 percent by 2004. However, it resisted IFI urgings to curb
its “wasteful” spending on universal subsidies for necessities and to reduce higher salaries and
pensions and other benefits to public sector employees (Chalk et al. 1997: 1-2, 6-7, 14-15, 24,
EIUa 2000 4: 16). Instead, the government restored subsidies and other current transfers to their
level of 1980, 24% of total government spending, from a low of 20% in 1990, and expanded
public employment benefits to cover Kuwaiti citizens working in the private sector (Askari 2006:
131).
Similarly, Kuwait’s hydrocarbons remained firmly in the public domain, and even its
small manufacturing sector, just 6.4% of GDP in 2005, remained dominated by state economic
enterprises such as petrochemicals, building materials and aluminum (World Bank 2006: 297).
Private capital played an active role in finance, as banking alone accounted for one-third of stock
market capitalization in 2005 (NBK 2006). Private investment dominated construction and real
estate, but the government supplied the framework with subsidies for land and residential
development and incentives to expand into new projects in tourism, hotels and resorts, and public
housing (Day et al. 2007).
Openings to Foreign Trade and Foreign Investment. Egypt and Jordan liberalized
foreign trade, but both had consistent trade deficits of about 20% of GDP over many years into
the 2000s and émigré remittances remained key to filling the gap (World Bank 2008b; ERF
2005: 65-68). The export of labor remained as important as the export of goods.
The World Bank ranked Kuwait as number 52 out of 181 countries in its “ease of doing
business” index, much higher than Egypt or Jordan, based on the generous tax cuts offered to
foreign business in 2008 and the room carved for foreign capital in the stock exchange, banking,
air transport and mobile phone service (EIUa 2008, July: 9-10), despite the closed hydrocarbon
sector receiving big infusions of public capital (Day et al. 2007).
In contrast, Egypt and Jordan liberalized foreign access to almost all sectors, but with
minimal impact on diversification. The stock of FDI in Egypt rose to just under 40% of GDP in
2007. However, the bulk resided in the hydrocarbon industry, with U.S.-based oil corporations
accounting for three-fourths of that stock (World Bank 2008b, EIU 2007: 182). Similarly in
Jordan, the tradables sector experienced a surge of FDI in free-enterprise zones (QIZs), where
mainly Asian entrepreneurs employed mostly Asian labor, to produce duty-free exports of
textiles and garments to the United States and Europe. While Jordan’s exports to the United
States grew to $1.5 billion in 2008, as compared to 25 million in 1997 (Abdelkrim 2009: 71-72),
this created few jobs for Jordanian workers and few opportunities for Jordanian capital, with
little technology transfer and only minor linkages into the domestic economy (ERF 2005: 66, 6970, 85).
Rebalancing Capital/Labor Relations. After years of protracted negotiations, both
Egypt and Jordan passed liberalized labor laws in the 2000s that granted business more
flexibility to hire and fire on economic grounds alone. In Egypt’s case, the law eliminated the
stronger job protections workers had had under the old social contract, with a “quid pro quo”
granting labor more freedom to organize and strike (Posusney 2007). Labor responded with a
huge wave of strike activity in 2006-2007, including lockouts of management, demanding living
wages and the right to elect their own leaders. This militancy spread into the general population
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in 2008, with more politicized demands, protesting rising food prices and asserting the right to
freely assemble, a movement that won the backing of many thousands more sympathizers via an
internet solidarity campaign that seemed to awaken even the somnolent left (Agbarieh-Zahalka
2008: 6-8; Beinin 2008: 2-3).
In Jordan unexpectedly, the new code retained more of the old job protections than in
Egypt, but made it harder for workers to contest firings and kept restrictions on strike activity
(Posusney 2007). Jordanian labor did not take up the challenge as in Egypt, perhaps because its
strength was muted by rigid labor market segmentation between the Jordanian citizenry working
at home or abroad in business or professional jobs and non-Jordanian immigrants concentrated in
more lowly occupations.
Kuwait did not liberalize its labor law but was challenged by an unprecedented labor
crisis in 2008. Due to the rapid growth of the South Asian economies, shortages of immigrant
labor led to pressure to raise wages and associated payments. For their part, the usually quiescent
workers mounted militant strikes and large-scale demonstrations demanding higher wages and
better working conditions. For the first time, the Minister of Social Affairs and Labor and the
leaders of the national assembly considered legal reforms to the inequitable system governing
relations between Kuwaiti employers and immigrant labor.
GROWTH, ACCUMULATION AND THE CRISIS OF NEOLIBERALISM
Regional Economic Relations in the 2000s
In the 2000s, economic links among the Arab countries were not only restored but
intensified, facilitated by the flush of petrodollars into the region during the boom of 2003-2007
and the drive for the Gulf oil exporters to use their growing current account surpluses
productively. The GCC countries had learned important lessons from the last oil boom in the
1970s-early 1980s and crash in the late-1980s-1990s, which were to diversify as much as
possible within their own countries and to export capital, including productive foreign direct
investment in the region on a broader and deeper scale.
Aid. Subsidized loans flowed from the oil exporters to the poorer states for specific large-scale
projects. For example, Kuwait’s KFAED provided a development fund of KD 26 million to
Egypt for 2008-2010 to rehabilitate the poultry industry after the devastation of the bird flu
epidemic.15 Similarly, KFAED provided $450 million in 2009 to help Jordan consolidate its
electricity network.16
Trade. Intra-Arab regional trade remained more important to countries like Egypt and Jordan
than to the region overall. At about 8% of total trade, intraregional trade was low by world
standards, as compared to the ASEAN countries’ 23 percent, for example. In 2000/1, although
Egypt purchased only 5.8 percent of its total imports from other Arab countries, it sold 13.6
percent of its exports to them (Feiler 2003: 246-247). Over the 1995-2003 period, Jordan’s
exports to the region averaged 45 percent of total exports and its imports 24 percent of total
imports (ERF 2005: 68).
Tourism and other Cross-border Travel. In the 2004-2007 period, Arabs from other
15

Médicins sans Frontières, 2/18/09, /www.flutrackers.com/forum/showthread.php?t=94742)

16

www.kuwaittimes.net/read_news.php?newsid=ODQwNTc3MDA5

23

countries accounted for 20 percent of the tourists and 25 percent of tourist nights spent in
Egypt,17 and Egyptians made up more than 10 percent of visitors to Kuwait in 2004.18 Aside
from tourism, Jordan was host to between 500,000 and 700,000 Iraqi refugees in 2007, many of
whom fled there to live and work, even to build houses and start businesses, for the duration of
the U.S. occupation and war (Nanes 2007).
Émigré Labor and Remittances. In 2005/06, 2.3 million Egyptians worked abroad,19
and, as indicated in Figure 13.4, remittances rose from an average of $3 billion from 2000 to
2003 to more than $5 billion in 2004 and 2005, the fifteenth highest dollar amount in the world.
In 2003, about 350,000 Jordanians worked abroad, while immigrant workers, many from Egypt
and Syria in sectors outside the QIZs, made up about 13 percent of its labor force.20 Figure 13.4
shows that Jordan’s receipts of remittances, ranging over the 1985 to 2005 period from a low of
$448 million in the dark days of 1991 to a high of $1.54 billion in 2005, tracked Kuwait’s
outflow of payments almost exactly. Jordan’s ratio of remittances to GDP, more than 20% in
2004, was the sixth highest in the world (World Bank 2006: 90).
Foreign Direct Investment. Investment in the region overall grew by almost 20 percent
in 2008, “accounting for 3.4 [percentage] points of the region’s 5.8 percent growth in the year,”
and the amount to the developing countries of the region, including Egypt and Jordan, rose from
$4.7 billion in 2000 to $26.4 billion in 2006 and $21.5 billion in 2007 (World Bank 2009: 163),
as shown in Figure 13.6.21
[Place Figure 13.6 about here]
The GCC countries accounted for one-third of total FDI (in dollar terms) to the
Mediterranean countries (MEDA)22 in particular, from 2003 through 2007, with Egypt receiving
40 percent of these GCC flows and Jordan 11 percent. Energy, heavy chemical industry (such as
fertilizers), cement and metallurgy accounted for 13 percent of GCC FDI, while telecom and
banking accounted for 15 percent. The remainder focused on transportation, high-end real estate
development, tourism, and shopping malls, with a small proportion to the production of light
industrial products and consumer goods for mass domestic consumption (Henry 2008: 14-16, 3132).
A thorough critique of this FDI argues that the amount was too low as compared to other
developing regions of the world, that only part was for new investment, and that many projects
did little to create jobs in the long run. Indeed half of the FDI went for acquisitions of existing
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Of 290,000 immigrant workers with work permits in 2006, over 95 percent received monthly wages of 150 JD or
less, about $225, in 2006. The females among them were almost entirely South Asian and worked in domestic
service with few legal protections (Arouri 2008: 6-8, 16, ERF 2005: 98-100), while over one-fourth of immigrant
workers were employed in the manufactured-exports sector, from whence numerous reports of ill-treatment
emanated (e.g., Greenhouse and Barbaro 2006).
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firms, including the purchase of privatized public sector enterprises, rather than for new
facilities. In 2007, for example, a company from the UAE took over the Egyptian Fertilizers
Company (Henry 2008: 19, 23, 26-27, 30). Similarly, Orascom Construction, an Egyptian
corporation that was listed as one of the top 100 non-financial transnational corporations (TNCs)
from developing countries in 2006 (UNCTAD 2008), was acquired in 2007 by LaFarge of
France (Henry 2008: 22).
Of the GCC total FDI to MEDA from 2003 through 2007, Kuwait was responsible for
100 projects worth 11 billion Euros, 23 projects in Egypt, and 18 projects in Jordan (Henry 2008:
30-31). Kuwait’s stock of investment in Egypt stood at $25 billion in early 2009, mostly in real
estate. Aside from Kuwait’s participation in a consortium to expand the international airport, its
investments in Jordan in 2007 were mainly acquisitions, such as an increase in Noor Telecom’s
stake in Jordan Telecom to 22 percent and the purchase of a 20-percent stake in a public works
and utilities contractor. (Henry 2008: 34, 67, 117-120).
Portfolio Investment. Region-based financial institutions were active in the 2000s
pursuing local “financialization.” Two of Kuwait’s biggest investments in 2007 were the
acquisition by the (private) National Bank of Kuwait of one of Egypt’s most successful private
banks, Al Watany Bank, and the purchase by the Global Investment House, a private equity firm,
of a significant stake in the private brokerage firm, Capital Trust, of Egypt (Henry 2008: 35, 67).
Arab investors were prominent in securities trading on the Amman Financial Market. In
the first quarter of 2007, while Arab traders were just 5.7 percent of “natural persons” whose
buying and selling of stocks represented about 10.5 percent of market value, their investing
companies were 14 percent of “judicial persons,” whose buying accounted for one-third of the
market value of shares traded and whose selling accounted for 22 percent.23
The Regional SSA amid the Structural Boom and Crisis of Neoliberalism
The intraregional investment described above was part of a larger, global pattern of
expanded sovereign wealth fund (SWF) activity in the 2000s.24 The capital for SWFs is based on
government accumulation of current account surpluses, which are then invested in a diverse
portfolio to generate a dependable stream of income to supplement or, in a situation of falling
commodity prices, to replace the income from exports. Gulf countries that rely on hydrocarbon
exports know well, after their experience of the 1980s and 1990s, that oil prices and revenues can
fluctuate widely and that they must prepare for the day when the oil runs out or the world shifts
to non-carbon based or renewable energy. The appropriate strategy is to invest in non23
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Sovereign wealth funds (SWFs) are investment agencies owned by governments but usually run by professional
managers as autonomous firms. They are distinct from the private holdings of wealthy individuals and families and
distinct from private equity firms, which tend to be closely held partnerships of very wealthy individuals, and
publicly traded mutual funds or investment companies. The top twenty SWFs as a group include funds – in some
cases, more than one -- from China, Hong Kong, Singapore, Russia, Norway and several other non-Middle Eastern
countries as well as GCC funds from the UAE, Saudia Arabia, Kuwait, Qatar and Bahrain. As a group, these twenty
had accumulated $2.5 trillion in assets as of January 1, 2008, and had grown impressively over the previous eight
years (Knowledge@Wharton, 9/22/08). Useful research on sovereign wealth funds can be found in Aizenman and
Glick 2008, Harris 2009, and at the websites of the Wharton School (knowledge.wharton.upenn.edu) and the
Council on Foreign Relations (www.cfr.org). Information, news articles and opinion about them can be found in a
series of articles in The Guardian of London from June of 2007 to March of 2009 (www.guardian.co.uk/business).
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hydrocarbon projects that contribute to the country’s development, diversify its economy, and
broaden sources of income.
Prior to the early 2000s, Gulf SWFs’ generally kept about half of their assets in lowerrisk dollar, euro, or yen denominated forms, such as bonds or blue-chip stocks, that provided a
relatively dependable income over the long run. The other half was held in portfolio or foreign
direct investment involving more risky equity commitments, which surged in the 2000s in the
form of domestic non-oil based development. Including real estate and infrastructure, large-scale
endeavors like the building of whole cities to serve new industries and services, and complex
projects in solar and wind power development, “the non-oil sectors in the 6 states of the GCC
averaged around 7 percent annual growth in the past half decade [i.e., 2002-2007]” (Teslik
2008). This was paired with increased FDI in the Arab region and other “emerging markets” as
described above.
The Boom. This investment program was too limited to accommodate the unprecedented gush
of oil revenues after 2002. GCC SWFs, except for Saudi Arabia’s SAMA fund which remained
conservative, then shifted their portfolios to favor more equity, more “alternatives” like
derivatives, and faster-growing emerging markets over the traditional slower-growth U.S. and
E.U. assets (Setser 2009: 23).25 Total GCC outflow from 2002 through 2006 approximated $560
billion, including 55 percent to the U.S., 30 percent to the EU, 5 percent to Asia, and 5 percent to
the MENA region (Setser 2007: 12). Part went for acquisition of U.S. properties, amounting to
over $2.6 billion from 2000 to 2005, for diverse activities like aircraft manufacture and a coffee
distribution and retail chain, and purchase of Manhattan real estate, like the Chrysler Building
(Blustein 2006). The funds then expanded further to purchase shares in alternative risky assets
such as hedge funds and private equity (Setser 2007).
GCC SWFs were swept up into the final throes of neoliberalism’s financial fireworks, and
ended 2007 holding more than $1 trillion in assets (Setser 2007:1). Following the Yale
University endowment model, the Kuwait Investment Authority (KIA) reduced the dollar
denominated share of fixed income assets and “traditional” U.S. equities to 40 percent, and
increased purchases of both emerging market equities to10 percent and more risky alternatives to
15 percent (Setser 2007: 7, 10, 12, 14; Setser 2009: 23). KIA’s assets rose from $55 billion at the
end of 1999 to $275 billion at the end of 2007 (Setser 2009: 1, 9), equivalent to about 250
percent of GDP (Aizenman 2008: 19, 37). When prices of alternative financial assets stopped
rising in early 2007, and before the markets began their descent, Gulf investors increased
purchases of shares in troubled western financial institutions, especially in the U.S., that were
threatened by the sub-prime mortgage crisis and the collapse of “alternatives” like collateralized
debt instruments, apparently to get good deals and to “learn financial management techniques”
from “the impressive global reach of the Anglo-Saxon banking model” (Olson 2007).
The Crash. Once they had bought into the more risk-prone strategy, and the markets
began to decline in 2007-2008, Gulf SWFs and wealthy private investors bought shares in wellestablished western financial institutions like Citigroup, Merrill Lynch, Morgan Stanley, Bear
Stearns, UBS, Credit Suisse, Barclay’s, Kaupthing, and the London Stock Exchange, among
25
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others, to help stabilize the markets for their own as well as the system’s sake. They then
incurred steep losses as the crisis deepened in the latter half of 2008, sucked down by one of the
core contradictions of neoliberalism’s demise, the financialization of asset creation and trade
without sufficient real investment to undergird the system. KIA’s portfolio shrank from $262
billion to 228 billion from the end of 2007 to the end of 2008, a net loss of 36 percent. As a
group, GCC SWF external portfolios fell by a net 27 percent, and the current account surpluses
provided by the major increase in oil revenues of the first half of 2008 were essentially erased by
this decline (Setser and Ziemba 2009: 1-2).
Impact on the Region. Output growth in the GCC remained positive in 2008 due to
ongoing projects in their domestic economies. However, as credit became scarcer and more
expensive and as the number of bond and equity issues to finance important projects was
reduced, the value of other financial assets fell across the region. From their peaks in spring 2008
to November, GCC stock markets fell 50 percent and Egypt’s bourse index dropped 54 percent
(World Bank 2009: 161). Profits at most firms traded on the Kuwait Stock Exchange dropped 94
percent in the first quarter of 2009 as compared to the first quarter of 2008, with the biggest
impact on investment companies and banks, especially those that had been active in mergers and
acquisitions in MEDA, like the National Bank of Kuwait.27 Even financial entities that were not
involved in the machinations of western institutions were hit. For example, 25 Islamic funds
were liquidated in 2008-2009, only 89 were launched (as compared to 271 over the same period
a year earlier), and average returns in 2008 were -39 percent as compared to 23 percent in
2007.28
GDP growth in the region overall was expected to remain positive in 2009, slowing from
5.8 percent in 2008 to 3.9 percent in 2009, as indicated in Figure 13.7. Investment growth was
also expected to remain positive, but to fall from 18.9% in 2008 to 7 percent in 2009 (World
Bank 2009: 163-165), sustained by public investment29 and ongoing commitments to a number
of large infrastructure projects, real estate, commerce, and industrial development, in Egypt and
Jordan in particular.
[Place Figure 13.7 about here]
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The MEDA economies did not fare as badly as the region as a whole, with a drop of 35
percent in incoming FDI in 2008 and a decline of 6% in the number of projects funded by the
GCC (Abdelkrim 2009: 7).30 Egypt’s GDP growth in 2009 was expected to be half of its 2008
rate, between 3.5 percent and 4 percent (Abdelkrim 2009: 66-67; and see Figure 13.7), sustained
by 102 new investment projects from 2008, about of third of which were sponsored by the GCC.
Jordan’s growth was projected to slow somewhat to 4.2 percent in 2009, down from 5.5 percent
in 2008, buttressed by 37 new FDI projects carried over from 2008, in energy, construction,
transportation, communications and manufacturing, including expanded commitments from
Kuwait to the international airport, railway and Aqaba industrial development projects, and
because Jordan “appears as a haven of stability in the eyes of investors… even if the infatuation
of Gulf state investors [with real estate in Jordan] have [sic] been affected by the crises” and
(Abdelkrim 2009: 71-72).
Prognosis for Building a New SSA
As of 2009, the region remained profoundly affected by oil price fluctuations and global
financial markets, the GCC exporters of oil and capital having been badly burned in both these
arenas in 2008. Given their current economic structures, the price of oil has to be at least $50 per
barrel (in constant 2007 dollars) in order to cover essential imports without having to liquidate
some capital assets (Setser 2007:2; 2009:1-4). If oil prices stabilized at $65 to$75 in 2009 (at
least $60 in 2007 constant dollars), the region would be able to sustain positive investment and
growth out of surplus revenues (World Bank 2009: 166), and higher prices would enable the
GCC SWFs to start growing again.31
Perhaps the more important lesson from the crises of 2008-2009 is that the diversification
of domestic investment and greater sophistication of intraregional FDI cushioned these
economies, as well as the economies of FDI recipients like Egypt and Jordan, and kept growth
prospects positive for 2009 despite a financial crisis and global recession. It is not apparent,
however, that a new SSA was engendered. There were many problems and limitations to the
institutional framework that governed economic growth and capital accumulation in the Arab
region in the 2000s. Intraregional FDI created wealth without much dispersion for raising
incomes to industrial or agricultural workers. It was focused on polluting industries like
hydrocarbon energy and chemical fertilizers, and on real estate, telecom, and tourism projects
that served an already wealthy clientele from Europe and the Gulf with little concern for ordinary
consumers, working conditions, or human development. It was focused more on the superficial
passing around of funds – banking, brokerage, and the local version of “financialization” – with
insufficient concern for investment in production for mass consumption or for long-term job
creation. It generated too few multiplier effects and linkages in local economies, leaving the
30
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If the price of oil were $75 in next 5 years, one analyst predicts that GCC SWFs would grow to $1.7-1.8 trillion.
At that point, the bulk of income would come from investments rather than oil, and the SWFs would be growing due
to interest, dividends and capital gains being added back in to the principal. It is very likely, at $75/bbl or above, that
portfolios would be rebalanced to increase the more conservative portion, 60 percent to US dollar assets, 25 percent
EU, 5 percent Japan, and only percent% to emerging markets (Setser 09: 15). If the price rose to $100/bbl, the GCC
SWFs would grow to $2.1 or 2.2 trillion by 2012 (Setser 09: 6, 15, 17-18).
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poorer countries as dependent as ever on remittances to fill critical gaps.
If a new SSA is to bloom in this region, the institutions will have to involve more thorough
regulation and organization of capital on an international level, deeper and broader real
investment, a commitment to “more sustainable and more socially useful projects” (Abdelkrim
2009: 8), closer regard for the needs of consumers and attention to the legitimate demands of
both domestic and émigré labor. Whatever the balance between government and private capital,
this region requires a new social contract to frame a culturally appropriate and sustainable SSA.
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Figure 13.1. Growth of Real GDP Per Capita: Egypt, Jordan,
Kuwait, 1975-2005
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Figure 13.2. Central Government Expenditure as % of
GDP: Egypt, Jordan, Kuwait, 1970-2004
100
90
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
1970

1975

1980

1985

1990

1995

2000

2004

Year
Egypt

Jordan

Kuwait

Source: Askari 2006: 121, Table 7.2.

Figure 13.3. Gross Fixed Capital Formation, Egypt, Jordan, Kuwait, 1960-2007,
as Percent of GDP
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Figure 13.4. Remittances,
Egypt, Jordan, Kuwait, 1985-2005
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Figure 13.5. Human Development Index,
Egypt, Jordan, Kuwait, 1975-2005
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Figure 13.6 Foreign Direct Investment,
Egypt, Jordan, Kuwait 2007
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Figure 13.7 Growth Projection for Real GDP,
Egypt, Jordan, Kuwait,* 1996-2010
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Note: *"Kuwait" values for 2008, 2009, 2010 are for "the resource rich labor importing group"
which also includes Bahrain, Oman and Saudi Arabia.

